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Abstract 
 
This case explores a cluster of firms that emerged sharing a particular ownership 
structure. Typically, clusters are thought of as interrelated firms that produce 
similar products and services.  However, we document the emergence and evolution 
of a cluster of entrepreneurial ventures that developed using a unique governance 
structure. We explore the deviant case of Renville, MN because of its notable 
success in developing a series of entrepreneurial ventures that provided producers 
with the opportunity to vertically integrate. 
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Introduction 
 
As farmers began expanding production and buying-up land throughout the 1970s, 
Renville area farmers realized horizontal expansion of their farming operation 
through the acquisition of additional acreage would not allow their community to 
prosper. Expanding farm size meant a dwindling number of farm families, making 
it difficult to maintain adequate infrastructure. For many communities across the 
Midwest, agricultural prosperity led to the demise of Main Street. But one rural 
community sought a revival. 
 
While some rural communities attempt to lure factories and industry to locate in 
their area, this strategy failed to work for Renville. Undaunted, Renville area 
farmers began to develop a unique model of producer ownership. Producers have 
consistently chosen to pursue this collective entrepreneurial strategy rooted in joint 
vertical integration and organizational innovation. Farmers began to develop their 
joint vertical integration strategy by chance when a local processor shut down. Over 
the next 25 years, these local producers developed business experience, professional 
contacts, and a well-seasoned network of fellow investors to support investments in 
processing and marketing facilities.  
 
To minimize high levels of investment and risk inherent in their ventures, these 
entrepreneurs developed an innovative organizational form: the New Generation 
Cooperative (NGC). This organizational form attracted many investors through the 
creation of investment incentives inaccessible to traditional forms of producer group 
action. After two well-publicized, profitable NGC ventures, farmers decided to 
pursue a similar strategy for several of the crops in their rotation. They joined 
together to identify opportunities to add value to a variety of their crops—primarily 
sugarbeets, corn, and soybeans. What began by chance after the closing of a 
sugarbeet processing facility, evolved into an interconnected agglomeration of local 
agribusinesses with a similar governance structure. 
 
Clustering of an Organizational Innovation 
 
Clustering of economic activity is widely recognized as resulting in economies of 
agglomeration. The great Alfred Marshall, in his classic text on economics, 
transformed the economic way of thinking by suggesting the existence of economies 
external to the firm that may be captured as a result of co-location. Due to 
proximity, firms may capture benefits from their industrial environment. Whether 
positing that firms co-locate for consumer convenience, from the sharing of a pool of 
laborers with specialized skills, or by borrowing innovative ideas, economists have 
long recognized the benefits of clustering (Marshall, 1890; Porter, 1998; Fujita, 
Krugman and Venables, 2001).  
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Economists often focus on clusters as “geographic concentrations of interconnected 
companies and institutions in a particular field” (Porter, 1998). In doing so, 
interrelated firms that produce similar products and services capture their 
attention. Recently, however, there has been a growing interest in the economic 
benefits derived from the clustering of certain organizational forms (Thompson, 
2003). What agglomeration economies are available to groups of firms sharing key 
organizational or managerial characteristics though producing a variety of 
products? How do organizational clusters develop? 
 
A Cluster of New Generation Cooperatives in Renville 
 
This case explores the adoption and diffusion of a unique organizational innovation 
that led to the development of a cluster of firms sharing a common governance 
structure, the NGC.  It is a story of a rural community, a set of complementary 
agricultural resources, and an innovative and industrious people. These 
entrepreneurs leveraged their resources and social capital to form a “cluster” of 
NGCs, a process widely described as the “Renville Phenomenon.” Unlike the typical 
industry cluster, this cluster is based not on a product, market segment, or 
technology, but on a particular set of organizational arrangements. Renville’s 
unique model of producer ownership became so popular that the town of Renville 
began charging observers – coming from as far away as Brazil, Japan, Australia, 
and several European countries – $25 per person to observe Renville’s business and 
community structure.  
 
We begin by describing Renville County, Minnesota, presenting a snapshot of its 
success.  To understand the roots and development of this phenomenon, we then 
trace this organizational innovation from its inception. We follow with a description 
of the unique aspects of the NGC governance model developed.  Finally, we describe 
the proliferation of a series of interconnected NGCs developed in the Renville area 
and question what key elements led to the development of this organizational 
cluster. 
 
Renville County, Minnesota 
 
Located in Minnesota’s western Corn Belt, Renville County is home to more than 
1,500 family farms (Exhibit 1). Average farm size is 570 acres. The average market 
value of products sold per farm is over $270,000 (Exhibit 2).  In 2002, Renville 
ranked number one in Minnesota in acres of corn for grain and soybeans with 
247,053 and 245,244 acres, respectively.  Renville County also ranked third in the 
state in acres of sugarbeets harvested with slightly more than 48,000 acres 
(National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2002). 
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Exhibit 1:  Map of Renville 
 
 
Source: http://www.co.renville.mn.us/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC={19D19153-9853-4F0E-AD69-
F7179CDB1241}  
 
 
Exhibit 2: Average Value of Agricultural Products Sold per Farm: 2002 
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The State of Minnesota leads the nation in acres of sugarbeets planted, with 
approximately 486,000 acres planted in 2004. Minnesota is also a top producer of 
corn and soybeans, ranking fourth in the nation in acres of corn and third in the 
nation in acres of soybeans planted. Average farm size in Minnesota is about 340 
acres, compared to the U.S. average of 441 acres. The average value of agricultural 
products sold per farm is $106,083, above the U.S. average of $94,245 (National 
Agricultural Statistics Service, 2002). 
 
Renville’s land is productive. However, transportation costs often put area farmers 
at a commodity trading or marketing disadvantage. Barge terminals on the 
Mississippi River and processing mills in the Twin Cities are some 100 miles away. 
Rail service is relatively expensive and unreliable. Therefore, “farmers pay close 
attention when there is talk of increasing the value of their corn and reducing the 
costs of transportation” (Gerber, 1996). Nonetheless, Renville is widely recognized 
as a highly innovative community, one where producers experiment with the latest 
technologies and business arrangements. Starting in the early 1990s, Renville 
County became known for numerous progressive and innovative producer owned 
and controlled cooperatives. Seven of these were of the configuration called the 
NGC. The NGCs included Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative (SMBSC), 
Minnesota Corn Processors (MCP), ValAdCo, Golden Oval Eggs (GOE), Churchill 
Cooperative, Phenix Biocomposites, and MinAqua Fisheries Cooperative. The City 
of Renville, home to four NGCs, bills itself as America’s “Cooperative Capital.” 
 
With 841 cooperatives and 185 credit unions, Minnesota is one of the nation’s 
leaders in terms of the number of organizations in the state using the cooperative 
form of governance.  About half of these cooperatives are agricultural 
cooperatives. Studies indicate Minnesota is home to 311 cooperatives, generating 
$6.07 billion in revenues and 79,363 jobs.  The economic impact of these 
cooperatives organizations is estimated at $10.89 billion (Folsom, 2003).  
 
Minnesota also leads the nation in NGCs as the home of at least 42 organizations 
with this unique governance structure (North Dakota is second, with 33, and Iowa 
ranks third, with 31.) (Merrett, et al., 2003). Minnesota became a hotbed for NGC 
investment in the 1990s, but the roots of this collective entrepreneurial movement 
began decades before, with a collective investment in sugarbeets. We delve into the 
historic development of this organizational form to uncover the origin of what would 
become a cluster of organizational innovation.  
 
Renville’s First NGC: Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative 
 
Renville’s first NGC was a sugarbeet processing facility built on the edge of town in 
1974. The “new generation” governance structure was a little known concept. And, 
Minnesota was a relatively small player in the sugarbeet industry. So, how and why 
did this new generation sugarbeet cooperative emerge in the small town of Renville? 
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Part of the answer lies in the hands of a few farmers who had added a profitable, 
alternative crop to their rotation years before and in a series of investments that 
would leave farmers with equipment of little value if sugarbeets were to be pulled 
from their rotation. In the next few paragraphs, we explore the roots of Minnesotan 
producers’ investment in sugarbeets, the specific nature of those investments, and 
the process by which producers chose the NGC model. Understanding these 
elements of Renville’s history and the success of early NGC pioneers allows us to 
begin to describe the process by which a cluster of NGCs developed in midwest 
Minnesota.    
 
In 1906, a sugar processing plant opened in Chaska, Minnesota, near Minneapolis 
(Exhibit 3). Growers who delivered to the plant were primarily from southern 
Minnesota (Minnesota Historical Society). However, in 1918, a farmer from 
northwestern Minnesota, in the Red River Valley, sent sugarbeets to the Chaska 
factory. Within a few years, other farmers from the Red River Valley were also 
producing small crops of sugarbeets to be sent to Chaska (University Archives). In 
the early 1920s, Red River Valley growers convinced the Minnesota Sugar Company 
to build a plant in their area on the condition area farmers help finance the project 
(Kotov, 2001).  
 
In 1925, Minnesota Sugar was purchased by an investor-owned firm that would 
later become American Crystal Sugar Company (Kotov, 2001). Farmers came 
together to organize a bargaining association, Southern Minnesota Beet Growers 
Association (SMBGA), to represent sugarbeet growers in negotiations with 
American Crystal Sugar (ACS) (Trucano, 1997). Southern Minnesota growers 
continued to deliver their beets to the ACS facility in Chaska.  
 
As processing capacity grew, growers began to increase sugarbeet production. Local 
processing capacity was crucial to the economic success of sugarbeet farms. To 
achieve greater production efficiency, farmers invested in specialized equipment 
such as defoliators and harvesters. This equipment was not used in other crop 
rotations, including corn and soybean.  The absence of a processing facility in the 
area would leave farmers owning equipment of little alternative value. Proximity 
was also crucial to sugarbeet growers. Long hauls usually reduce grower returns, 
not only in terms of transportation costs but also in terms of lost sucrose content.  
Grower payments are generally based on the “extractable sucrose content of their 
beets” (Cattanach, Dexter and Oplinger, 1991).  And, sucrose content declines 
quickly after harvesting, depending upon piling and temperature conditions 
(Brester and Boland., 2004). 
 
Domestic agricultural policy played an important role in sugarbeet industry growth 
during the Post World War II period. The Sugar Act of 1948 supported domestic 
sugar prices and, consequently, production. This act, which remained in effect until 
1974, established domestic and import quotas (Minnesota Historical Society).  
Burress et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 11, Issue 4, 2008 
 
© 2008 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved. 55
Exhibit 3: Timeline of the Early Years: Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative 
Year Event 
1906 Sugarbeet plant opens in Chaska, MN 
 
1941 Southern Minnesota Beet Growers Association formed to represent sugarbeet 
growers in southern Minnesota in negotiations with American Crystal Sugar 
 
1960 Sugarbeets continue to be an important crop in the region, despite growing 
concern that government support for the sugar industry may be waning 
 
1971 Chaska Plant Closes 
 
1972 Growers in southern Minnesota begin organizing to build their own processing 
facility in Renville, MN to be named Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar 
Cooperative 
 
1973 Growers in Red River Valley buy remaining American Crystal Sugar facilities 
and convert the company to a cooperative 
Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative signs a joint management 
agreement with American Crystal Sugar 
 
1974 Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative must delay plans to open their 
factory due to construction delays and the uncertainty of financing arrangements 
 
1975 Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative begins processing sugarbeets, but 
their success was fraught with management and technical problems 
 
1976 Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative and American Crystal Sugar 
consider a merger 
Merger proposal fails to receive 2/3 vote among American Crystal Sugar 
shareholders 
 
1977 Proposed merger with American Crystal Sugar is defeated again 
Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative’s financial backers fought to “cut 
their losses” and withdraw from the Renville processing facility 
Some growers decided not to plant their contracted acreage 
 
1978 Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative hires their own management team 
and amends bylaws to penalize growers who did not plant their full 1977 crop 
Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative finally signs a long-term loan 
agreement that was achieved with the help of a loss-sharing agreement between 
construction lenders and the contractor 
 
1980 Second year of successful operations at Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar 
Cooperative 
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Foreign policy also played a role in sugar production decisions. While sugar is 
produced in almost every country, cane producers have a cost of production 
advantage. When trade ceased between the United States and Cuba in the early 
1960s, the US sugar industry hoped they would see a boost in their production 
quotas (Minnesota Historical Society). However, sugar imports from other nations 
made up the shortfall. American Crystal Sugar’s strategic reaction was 
retrenchment, selling off what assets they could and closing plants that were too 
unattractive to be purchased. This is the volatile, excess capacity, low-margin 
environment in which the domestic industry found itself in the late 1960s.   
 
By the early 1970s, Renville area growers had a substantial investment in 
sugarbeet equipment. Nevertheless, the Chaska plant, to which southern 
Minnesotan growers delivered, was an aging facility. Citing “small size, 
obsolescence, high cost of freighting beets, and the cost of renovating and adding 
pollution controls,” ACS announced its decision to close the Chaska plant in 1971 
(Southern Minnesota Sugar Cooperative). Sugarbeet growers in southern Minnesota 
were left without a market for their sugarbeets (Exhibit 4 and 5).  
 
The SMBGA began the search for a sugar-manufacturing firm willing to build a 
processing facility in southern Minnesota. SMBGA approached several established 
companies including Michigan Sugar Company, Utah and Idaho Sugar Company, 
Amalgamated Sugar, C&H, Cargill, General Mills, Pillsbury, and International 
Multifoods. The companies’ responses were generally consistent: returns on 
 
Exhibit 4:  Acres of Sugarbeets Planted in Select States as a percent of 
 US Total Acres Planted, 1924-2004 
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Exhibit 5:  Acres of Sugarbeets Harvested in Select MN Counties, 1967-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
investment in processing were not large enough to warrant building a new factory. 
Area growers concluded “if a factory were to be built,” they would “have to do it 
themselves” (Trucano, 1997). But no single producer could afford an investment in a 
processing facility with efficient scale.  
 
Similar problems faced growers north of Renville, in the Red River Valley. 
Producers were uneasy with the prospect of ACS plant closings. They noted that 
remaining ACS facilities were not being maintained properly. Therefore, the Red 
River Valley Growers Association (RRVGA) sought representation on American 
Crystal’s board of directors (Volkin and Bradford, 1975). Members of the association 
decided to begin raising capital to purchase 100,000 ACS shares to ensure growers 
could “exert sufficient growing power to influence” corporate decisions. In the 
process, however, RRVGA decided to see if ACS would be willing to sell the 
organization outright. After almost two years of negotiations, antitrust hearings, 
and complex legal and financial arrangements, ACS, a New Jersey corporation, 
converted to a cooperative on June 14, 1973 (Volkin and Bradford, 1975). 
 
The Red River Valley Growers, their experience and their decision to convert an 
investor-owned firm into a New Generation Cooperative encouraged and challenged 
Renville area growers to pursue a similar strategy. While Red River Valley growers 
organized to the north, a core group of growers in southwest Minnesota grew 
determined to own a local processing facility as well. The Southern Minnesota Beet 
Growers Association spent much of 1972 holding exploratory meetings with 
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growers. Their grand plans started with a small commitment from would be 
producer-investors.  Plans to build their own processing facility began with SMBGA 
board members initially asking growers to put up only $5 per acre “to use as seed 
money” (Trucano, 1997).  
 
In order to choose the optimal site for construction of a new processing facility, 
SMBGA set the following location decision criteria:  
 
1) a central location was of critical importance because of the need 
to minimize freight problems (the Growers Association vowed 
not to repeat the freight problems experienced at Chaska);  
2) adequate space (at least 600 acres) to permit the construction of 
waste water holding ponds and to serve as a buffer against 
neighboring landowners;  
3) access to good highways and a financially-sound railroad;  
4) availability of electricity; and  
5) availability of a good water supply. (Trucano, 1997) 
 
A section of land bordering Highway 212, just east of Renville, was selected as the 
best location.  While producer-owned organizations can be vulnerable to influence 
activities among their members to affect the location chosen for building, SMBGA 
leaders took a Marshallian approach to deciding location: they attempted to co-
locate their processing facilities with existing assets and infrastructure to capture 
any present external economies (Tong, 1997). 
 
As growers’ attempts to arrange financing, construction, and management of the 
sugarbeet processing facility ensued, their resolve was continually challenged by 
complex financing arrangements, construction design problems, poor initial 
operational efficiency, and low levels of commitment on the part of some producers. 
Growers contributed equity capital to the venture in proportion to the acres of 
sugarbeets they were contracted to deliver. Much of this equity capital was financed 
through a series of individual loans and guaranty funds. In other words, funds not 
contributed upfront, in cash, were made available by lenders only after (1) 
promissory notes were signed with each individual producer, (2) a guaranty fund 
was set up by the Cooperative to fund any defaults, and (3) producers agreed to 
make annual contributions to the guaranty fund to cover any potential defaults by 
fellow growers (Trucano, 1997). 
 
The complexity and uncertainty of long-term debt financing agreements left the 
venture with little working capital and little ability to afford the high salaries of 
upper management.  When managerial or construction problems ensued, delays 
were inevitable. Delayed construction combined with design problems, mechanical 
breakdowns, unresponsive management, and ill-prepared workers led to poor 
operating and financial results. Consequently, some growers did not fulfill delivery 
Burress et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 11, Issue 4, 2008 
 
© 2008 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved. 59
contracts, further exacerbating the problem of operating efficiencies. Non-delivery of 
sugarbeets was a serious threat to the cooperative. The success of the sugarbeet 
processing facility would depend upon the producers’ ability and willingness to 
maintain the supply of input factors while the facility worked to optimize 
operations. Producers began to realize they would only receive payment for their 
sugarbeet deliveries if the cooperative was profitable. Tensions ran high because 
growers had put their farms and their future at risk to invest in this venture.  
 
While processing facilities opened and slicing began in 1975, it wasn’t until 1978 
that the cooperative was able to resolve many of its operating challenges. In 1978, 
the cooperative’s board of directors amended their bylaws to give the ability to 
recover stock or penalty payments from growers who failed to honor their delivery 
contracts. The cooperative learned to appreciate the value of strict supply contracts. 
SMBSC also hired new management and finalized long-term financing agreements.  
 
The cooperative’s financial health depended on a settlement with construction 
lenders. Facing significant losses if the cooperative were to close its doors, 
construction lenders reached an agreement with SMBSC that would allow the 
processing facility to remain open. Fifteen percent of the loan amount was to be 
paid immediately. Profit-sharing mechanisms were also put in place with 
construction lenders for a fifteen-year period. 
 
Today “Southern Minn,” the area’s first NGC, processes and markets sugarbeets 
and their co-products for the producer-owners. As farmers across the midwest were 
hit by an agricultural crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s, sugarbeet farmers in 
Renville were entering into a new era of prosperity. Sugarbeet processing income 
provided an additional source of revenue and helped to stabilize the agricultural 
economy in the area while traditional corn and soybean crop farms suffered.     
 
The NGC: Promoting Collective Investment through Organizational 
Innovation  
 
Subsequently, grower groups from many states in the US and numerous countries 
have adopted variations of the investment and governance model developed by the 
sugarbeet growers in the Red River Valley and southern Minnesota. This 
governance, or organizational, structure has come to be known as the NGC. 
Governance structure, in this context, refers to the institutional framework and 
method of organizing producer-investors utilized to order their transactions, reduce 
potential conflict, and realize potential gains (Williamson, 1996).  
 
Vaguely Defined Property Rights 
 
When compared with the traditional agricultural cooperative model, numerous 
organizational design, internal incentive, decision authority, and property rights 
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attributes emerge as distinguishing characteristics of the NGC (Exhibit 6). The 
organizational innovations adapted in this model are hypothesized to ameliorate 
certain vaguely defined property rights associated with the traditional cooperative 
model. Vaguely defined property rights in an organization can exacerbate common 
cooperative dilemmas such as free-rider, horizon, portfolio, influence and control 
problems (Cook, 1995).  
 
Exhibit 6: The Structure of Ownership and Control Rights in Cooperatives 
Traditional Cooperative New Generation Cooperative 
Open membership 
 
Defined membership 
Growth capital from retained earnings Growth capital from up-front equity 
investments and pooled retains 
 
No obligation to deliver raw materials 
 
Binding delivery contracts: right and 
obligation to deliver 
 
No investment liquidity 
 
Investment liquidity through limited 
transferable equity shares 
 
No appreciation of investment Capital appreciation through limited 
secondary market valuation 
 
 
All organizations may be affected, to some degree, by vaguely defined property 
rights.  The term vaguely defined property rights stems from the notion of 
incomplete contracting—the claim that all contracts inevitably contain gaps or 
loopholes. Why can’t we develop contracts to cover all possible contingencies? 
Researchers generally look to three main arguments when explaining the 
incompleteness of contracts 1) unforeseen circumstances, 2) high costs of exhausting 
contingencies and 3) imprecision of language (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  
 
Because contracts are incomplete, non-contracted or residual control rights and 
residual claimant rights must be assigned to one or more parties. Residual control 
rights are defined as the “right to make any decisions concerning the asset’s use 
that are not explicitly controlled by law or assigned to another by contract” 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Similarly, residual claimant rights are the rights to 
receive any net income the firm produces after all contractual obligations have been 
met. The coupling of these rights ensures that actors bear the full financial risk of 
their actions. Decoupling of claimant and control rights creates the potential for 
agency costs and cooperative dilemmas, as those actors possessing residual control 
rights can make decisions that affect the net income available to claim without 
bearing the full wealth effects of their decision. 
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Decoupling of Residual Claimant and Residual Control Rights in the Traditional 
Cooperative 
 
Cook and Iliopoulos argue that, in the traditional cooperative, claimant and control 
rights are slowly decoupled, resulting in an inefficient organization (Cook and 
Iliopoulos, 1999). Overtime, residual claimant and control rights are redistributed 
resulting in significant costs to the organization in terms of collective decision-
making and agency costs. While this topic is as complex as the variety of 
cooperatives that exist, a few general examples can be given. In traditional 
cooperatives, membership is generally open to anyone choosing to deliver to the 
cooperative. A small fee, ranging from $25-$100 dollars may be assessed, but 
membership and voting rights are granted to any person meeting membership 
qualifications. Members may choose to deliver goods to or purchase goods from the 
cooperative, but are not obligated to do so. Depending on the market conditions, this 
often translates into fluctuations in supply and demand that are difficult to predict 
and manage, impacting the operational efficiency of the organization.   
 
If the cooperative’s payment method is a “cost of goods sold” (COGS) approach, 
earnings are allocated to members. To maintain certain tax advantages, twenty 
percent of the earnings must be paid in cash. Usually, marketing COGS 
cooperatives will distribute a greater percentage in the form of cash. The remaining 
allocated equity is kept within the cooperative as working capital. After a few years, 
allocated equity is returned at book value to the member in proportion to patronage. 
Before this allocated capital is returned to the member, however, cooperatives may 
have already experienced a decoupling of ownership and control rights. Those 
members maintaining a significant proportion of allocated equity may no longer be 
maintaining equivalent proportions of patronage. 
 
In a pooled cooperative, which is the case in many NGCs, a portion of net revenue is 
retained for working capital use while the rest is distributed to members in 
proportion to patronage as “net proceeds.” The allocated, but undistributed, capital 
is considered equity capital. Since this equity is redeemed at book value, there is 
little or no incentive to trade it and no opportunity for appreciation in value. In 
traditional marketing cooperatives, this equity capital is acquired in a passive or 
quasi-passive manner whereas, in NGCs, the original risk capital is invested “up-
front.”  This up-front investment is called a delivery right (or share), is treated as a 
tradable and appreciable asset, and is non-redeemable. The amount of delivery 
rights is finite in number, thus decreasing some of the free-riding problems 
associated with open-membership cooperatives.   
 
Membership, Investment and Contractual Characteristics of the NGC 
 
Cooperatives that began in the early part of the twentieth century may have been 
able to borrow up to ninety percent in order to build their facilities. However, as 
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sugarbeet growers discovered in 1972, the cooperative banks were reluctant to lend 
more than sixty percent of project costs (Trucano, 1997). Therefore, if growers 
wanted to build a processing facility, it was necessary to capitalize the organization 
up-front, with significant initial grower investment. Up-front risk capital 
investments, processing efficiency, and quotas on sugar rendered a policy of open 
membership and voluntary delivery economically infeasible.   
 
The NGC model builds on characteristics embodied in the sugarbeet model. These 
characteristics begin to ameliorate some of the “efficiency-robbing effects of vaguely 
defined property rights” in the traditional cooperative model (Cook and Iliopoulos, 
1999). Non-redeemable equity investments provide both user and investor benefits. 
As a user, shares provide the farmer the contractual right and obligation to deliver 
a specified raw material. Shares are also appreciable and transferable, providing 
the farmer potential returns on the initial investment as well as limited liquidity. 
An initial share offering may be open to qualified producers as defined in the 
cooperative bylaws. However, after share offerings, membership is closed. Future 
user-investors must wait for another offering or purchase existing shares from a 
current NGC member to acquire delivery rights. 
 
NGCs are a hybrid: a complex organizational structure subject to intricate state and 
federal tax codes. Cooperative organizers often note the substantial time and money 
spent with specialized legal teams and accountants. Organizers in other states, 
attempting to recreate the Renville model, have learned the importance of 
collaboration with organizers, accountants, and lawyers having expertise in these 
unique cooperative structures when beginning a new venture of this nature. 
 
Producers Fighting to Survive Are Met with Opposition 
 
Conditions were not favorable for adopting the traditional cooperative model in the 
1980s. Traditional cooperatives had systematically relied heavily on debt to finance 
their infrastructure investments. But, cooperatives organizing in the 1980s were 
met with high interest rates and banks reluctant to lend to organizations with less 
than a fifty percent equity position. Banks were simply not in a position to take on 
the level of risk they held even a few years before with the development of SMBSC. 
Many farmers were convinced they needed to invest in processing facilities, adding 
value to their crops, in order to survive rapid consolidation in the agricultural 
industry. They decided to utilize the radically different organizational design 
pioneered by SMBSC.  
 
Radical changes in governance structure, however, meant that cooperatives were 
created with defined membership: delivery of commodities was neither open nor 
voluntary. The proliferation of this new governance structure brought about strong 
reactions among local farmers. Many farmers were opposed to the notion of defined 
membership. They contended that the spirit of cooperation involved open 
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membership. And yet, the open membership model provided no incentive or 
mechanism for investors to provide risk capital to cooperative ventures, especially 
for capital-intensive processing entities. Growers were not unanimous in their views 
regarding this new governance structure. While farmers in the area debated over 
whether the innovative idea of defined membership was aligned with their view of 
cooperative principles, an eager subset continued a vertical investment strategy 
based on the NGC model despite debate. 
 
Cooperative Fever: A Wave of NGCs in Renville and the Surrounding 
Area 
 
The Minnesotan sugarbeet governance model was developed in part by following an 
organizational strategy borrowed from Suiker Unie in the Netherlands, another 
producer-owned sugarbeet cooperative. In consultation with Minnesotan growers, 
Suiker Unie leaders posed an important question: why were American new 
generation sugarbeet cooperatives only working with sugar when “most beets are 
grown in three year crop rotation schemes” (Egerstrom, 1994).  Renville area 
growers took this line of questioning to heart. They began a quest to utilize the 
NGC model to add value to their corn and soybean crops (Exhibit 8).  What 
happened next has come to be known as “cooperative fever” (Harris, Stefanson and 
Fulton, 1996; Patrie, 1999) .   
 
Farmers began developing cooperative enterprises, applying the “sugarbeet model” 
to other crops (Exhibit 7).  The 1980s and 1990s saw a wave of cooperatives develop 
in southern Minnesota and North Dakota. The sugar cooperatives in Renville and 
the Red River Valley served as generic models to growers of other commodities. As 
producers observed the success and challenges of the NGC structure, they began to 
modify organizational practices, policies, and bylaws to fit their membership 
preferences. Producers who developed leadership and organizational management 
experience serving on one cooperative board would subsequently share their 
expertise with other organizations by serving on multiple boards. Often, bylaws 
from a previous organization were consulted when forming a new entity. 
Familiarity with the model, its advantages and disadvantages, proved valuable as 
growers continued to tinker with organizational arrangements in an effort improve 
the sugarbeet model. This tacit knowledge, gained by leadership or investment roles 
in previous cooperatives, supplemented the emergence of NGCs in the area. Tacit 
knowledge is difficult to measure because it is generally acquired through 
experience or learning by doing (Arrow, 1962; Polanyi, 1966). Despite measurement 
difficulties, however, this concept enhances our understanding of the creation of 
new firms and cooperative development (Zook, 2004; Goldsmith and Gow, 2005). 
 
The disadvantages of producing agricultural commodities including low per unit 
prices and volatile markets, spurred farmers to search for better strategies. From 
their experience with sugarbeets, farmers “understood the value” of their crops and 
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Exhibit 7: Renville Phenomena Timeline  
Year  Event 
1972 Growers in Southern Minnesota begin organizing to build their own processing 
facility 
 
1973 Growers in Red River Valley buy remaining American Crystal Sugar facilities 
and convert company to a cooperative 
 
1975 Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative begins processing sugarbeets 
 
1978 Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative resolves management problems and 
amends bylaws to penalize growers who did not plant their full 1977 crop 
 
1980 Minnesota Corn Processors forms 
 
1989 Co-op Country explores investments to resolve equity redemption problems 
 
1991 ValAdCo forms in order to pursue opportunities in the hog industry that had 
been identified by Co-op Country 
 
1992 Phenix forms, exploring environmentally friendly building materials that utilize 
soy flour and wheat 
 
1993 United Mills is developed by Co-op Country, ValAdCo and Golden Oval Eggs to 
meet local feed milling needs 
Churchill forms 
 
1994 Golden Oval Eggs legally forms, producing liquid egg, as a strategy for adding 
value to members’ corn. 
 
1996 MinAqua forms utilizing soy pellets for tilapia feed 
 
1999 Golden Oval Eggs expands to Thompson, Iowa 
 
2004 Golden Oval Eggs converts to a Limited Liability Company 
 
 
were no longer satisfied to deliver commodities “to the local elevator, with future 
profits enjoyed by those who refined and processed farm commodities” (Buschette, 
2001). These farmers created an organizational structure that provided incentives 
to invest and the ability to gain necessary scale economies to compete with large 
agribusinesses (Exhibit 9). By expanding vertically, these producers were able to 
“profit” by utilizing their low cost commodities as inputs into their “value-added” 
cooperatives. Within a short period of time, a number of these models emerged in 
the Renville area.  A brief description of a few of the organizations active in the 
development of this organizational cluster, as well as the way in which they were 
interconnected, follows.  
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Exhibit 8:  Acres of Corn for Grain Planted in Minnesota Counties (Top 4 in 2004), 
1972-2004 
Year Renville Redwood Martin Stearns 
1972 198,200  187,300  164,200  144,400  
1973 224,000  211,700  167,500  164,600  
1974 246,500  223,900  199,300  184,600  
1975 242,700  225,700  211,600  179,100  
1976 222,000  215,500  226,000  200,000  
1977 166,700  182,000  195,000  217,500  
1978 186,500  199,900  189,900  218,900  
1979 186,300  192,700  188,400  223,700  
1980 184,900  203,300  199,400  227,000  
1981 190,700  208,400  196,400  251,400  
1982 182,500  201,800  188,600  245,200  
1983 129,200  146,800  136,700  164,100  
1984 203,200  206,500  187,700  226,500  
1985 203,400  200,100  183,900  226,200  
1986 181,200  169,400  157,500  192,600  
1987 152,000  155,600  155,500  193,200  
1988 162,000  165,000  163,000  178,000  
1989 180,900  190,800  182,100  184,900  
1990 210,000  212,200  206,900  194,600  
1991 209,300  208,800  161,900  234,600  
1992 226,400  218,300  213,100  246,300  
1993 222,400  194,100  188,500  188,800  
1994 238,800  226,200  222,500  201,600  
1995 221,100  208,700  201,600  231,500  
1996 245,500  238,200  228,500  240,800  
1997 232,900  221,600  207,600  215,500  
1998 242,200  232,600  215,800  212,100  
1999 239,900  233,600  217,600  206,700  
2000 244,200  231,500  218,300  199,000  
2001 239,500  231,000  207,700  200,000  
2002 249,500  233,300  217,500  204,300  
2003 246,600  233,300  216,200  208,300  
2004 258,000  240,400  218,700  214,700  
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 
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Exhibit 9: Ownership Rights Framework 
Ownership 
Rights
Traditional: Co-op Country (1986)
Proportional Member 
Investment
Benefits to Investors
Non-Redeemable and 
Transferable
Proportional Investment Cooperatives
Member-Investor Cooperatives
NGC:  SMBSC (1972), MCP (1980), ValAdCo (1991), 
GOE (1994), MinAqua (1996)
Traditional Investing Vertically:    
Co-op Country attempts (1990)
Traditional Creating NGC:   
Co-op Country (1991)
Proportional Investment Cooperatives with Vertical 
Investment
Member-Investor Cooperatives with Vertical Investment
NGC with Vertical Investment
NGC Collaboration: United Mills (1993)
Non-Conversion Outside Equity Not  in Cooperative
Investor-Oriented Firms: MCP sells to ADM (2002)
Cooperatives with Capital Seeking Companies
Investor-Share Cooperatives
LLC: GOE (1994),  MCP (2000)
Limited Liquidity
Chaddad and Cook (2004) ; Cook and Chaddad (2004) 
 
Key Stakeholders in the Development of a Cluster of Organizational 
Innovation 
 
Minnesota Corn Processors   
 
In 1980, farmers “disillusioned with corn prices” decided to pursue a strategy of 
processing their own products (Gerber, 1996). They formed Minnesota Corn 
Processors (MCP) in order to process corn into “ethanol, starches, syrups, dextrose, 
feed, and corn oil” (Buschette, 2001). Aided by, $1.86 million in tax-increment 
financing from the city, MCP’s $55 million plant opened in 1983. While their 
success was not immediate, MCP’s eventual prosperity led them to expand three 
times in the early 1990s.   
 
The MCP plant is located in Marshall, Minnesota, approximately fifty miles from 
Renville. While the plant was built outside their county, Renville farmers were 
instrumental in soliciting equity capital contributions and designing the governance 
structure. Several farmers who had a wait-and-see attitude with respect to SMBSC 
were determined not to miss out on this investment opportunity. As sugarbeet 
processors turned a profit on their investment, those producers solely involved in 
corn and soybeans clamored to enter a successful processing venture (University of 
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Manitoba). Due to their closed nature, it would result difficult to buy shares of a 
successful NGC after the initial offering. 
 
Co-op Country Farmers Elevator   
 
Co-op Country is a traditional cooperative headquartered in Renville, MN. In early 
1990, Co-op Country recognized that a “large number of their patrons would reach 
retirement age within a few years,” causing the cooperative to suffer financial 
constraints in redeeming member equity (Buschette, 2001). This was a pressing 
issue for many traditional cooperatives. Originally, Co-op Country board members 
explored potential investments that would serve as an additional source of income 
to solve this equity bubble problem. The value-added projects considered included 
swine, turkey, and egg production.  Ethanol was ruled out because, they felt, MCP 
was already available to their members as an investment opportunity. The hog 
industry was chosen as the most viable venture.   
 
However, the discussion over potential investments in swine or sow multiplier units 
became emotionally charged. An investment in sow multiplier units was eventually 
rejected by a majority of Co-op Country members due to concerns that the 
cooperative’s involvement in the industry would drive local farmers out of the hog 
business. Board members were disheartened after the vote – and concerned that 
their plan to resolve their equity redemption problem would not come to fruition. 
Within days, however, board members began receiving phone calls from members, 
urging them to develop alternative business plans and offering to support ventures 
that allowed farmers to invest “alongside” Co-op Country. They urged the Co-op 
Country board to explore a cooperative similar to SMBSC in structure, with Co-op 
Country acting as a major investor. Co-op Country management continued to 
explore alternative business opportunities. 
 
ValAdCo   
 
One group of farmers decided to pursue the swine production idea rejected by Co-op 
Country’s membership (Buschette, 2001). Co-op Country was a large organization 
with a diverse membership. A smaller subset of Co-op Country farmers was better 
able to organize their interests as a separate entity. ValAdCo’s intent was to add 
value to members’ corn, utilizing corn for feed in sow multiplier units. Having 
received a mandate from their members not to pursue investments in the swine 
industry, Co-op Country shared their industry research and business plan with 
ValAdCo founders. ValAdCo, then, worked from the bylaws of MCP, SMBSC, and 
Dakota Growers Pasta, (a NGC in North Dakota) to develop their governance 
structure.  Bylaws from each of these organizations were readily available to 
ValAdCo leaders, as many of them were members of these NGCs as well.  ValAdCo 
leaders also chose rely on the same legal representation as SMBSC, a firm that had 
become well-versed in this distinct ownership structure over the years. 
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Churchill Cooperative   
 
Another Renville corn marketing NGC, Churchill Cooperative, also chose to invest 
in sow multiplier operations. ValAdCo and Churchill “built two of the biggest and 
most controversial hog farms in the state” (Losure, 1999).  For a number of years 
these two NGCs were considered pioneers in a growing producer-owned livestock 
sector. They pioneered a new technology that involved storing manure in open 
lagoons. This technology, now characterized as “failed” and “outdated,” caused 
Churchill and ValAdCo to suffer from problems involving environmental regulation, 
legal fees, and community opposition (Losure, 1999). Churchill leaders gained their 
familiarity with the NGC structure through more than proximity: the majority of 
leaders were investor-members, Board members, and core organizers of SMBSC. 
 
Golden Oval Eggs   
 
After failing to gain the membership’s approval to invest in the hog industry, Co-op 
Country searched for new opportunities that met their members’ investment and 
growth preferences. The egg industry was their next venture. In 1994, a business 
venture planned and initiated by Co-op Country established the NGC Golden Oval 
Eggs. Co-op Country invested twenty-five percent of the necessary equity for Golden 
Oval Eggs. The remaining equity investments came from grain producers in the 
Renville area.  
 
The founders of Golden Oval developed a plan to add value to members’ corn by 
using it as feed in layer operations. And, they chose to produce raw, liquid egg “in 
part because of ease and savings in transportation” (Buschette, 2001). Golden Oval 
developed a strategy called the “Totally Integrated Food System” (Golden Oval 
Eggs). This system began with high quality grains produced by shareholders, relied 
on a single local supplier for pullets, and linked laying barns with breaking and 
cooling systems – allowing Golden Oval to control all aspects of production from the 
feed to the final liquid product. The integrated system provided significant levels of 
quality and consistency (Buschette, 2001).  
 
Through delivery requirements and marketing agreements, NGCs have the 
potential to exercise greater control over supply and production process than 
investor-owned firms purchasing inputs from independent producers. Ability to 
control inputs, as well as the entire production process, can improve quality. This 
provides producer organizations with significant advantages over non-cooperative 
businesses.   
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United Mills   
 
Recognizing the need to meet increased feed milling requirements, the boards of Co-
op Country, Golden Oval, and ValAdCo decided to negotiate the construction of 
United Mills. A “collaborative venture between a value-added co-op and a 
traditional co-op was a new idea….Such a project had simply not been considered 
before” (Buschette, 2001).  Organized as a cooperative in 1993 and built in 1994, the 
equity investment of $750,000 was divided equally among the three founding 
members.   
 
United Mills had a joint management agreement with Co-op Country. Treated as a 
cost center, United Mills charged members a standardized price allocated on a per-
ton basis; variable delivery fees and future capitalization allotments were also 
included. During the first three years, production efficiencies and increased volumes 
lowered the per ton charges from $20 to $6. Within three and one half years the 
members recuperated their original investment. The NGCs were able to meet their 
milling needs for rations while Co-op Country generated direct profits from selling 
the milled product.  
 
Phenix Biocomposites  
 
In 1992, Phenix Biocomposites was formed as a NGC.  Located in Mankato, MN, 
about 100 miles southeast of the City of Renville, Phenix had a new technology to 
make biocomposites for the construction, furniture, and design industries. Their 
products, which are environmentally friendly alternatives to wood or marble, utilize 
agricultural materials including soy flour and wheat (Environ Biocomposites). 
Again, Renville area farmers were active investors, anxious to develop a value-
added NGC for yet another crop in their rotation. 
 
MinAqua Fisheries Cooperative   
 
MinAqua processes producers’ soybeans to soy pellets for use as tilapia feed. 
Generating enough warm water to raise tilapia in Minnesota would never have 
been possible, however, without SMBSC. The beet processing facility produces six to 
ten thousand gallons of nutrient-rich, 95-125 degree water per minute as a by-
product of beet processing. Since the SMBSC plant was dedicated, city officials 
talked of utilizing its excess hot water for commercial purposes. After receiving a 
$500,000 federal economic development grant in 1997, the City of Renville 
developed a heat recovery plant. Cost savings estimated at one to three and a half 
dollars per million BTUs (British Thermal Units) were enough for MinAqua to be a 
feasible project. MinAqua utilizes only ten percent of the available heat energy. 
Therefore, Renville is looking to take advantage of industrial symbiosis 
opportunities by developing additional local businesses around this low cost heat 
energy.  
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Understanding the Renville Phenomena 
 
As discussed above, Renville NGCs share many characteristics. All are producer-
owned, pursue “value-added” strategies, are run by demanding, active investors, 
and – most importantly – have adopted the “new generation” organizational 
structure. The geographic concentration of such firms can hardly be coincidence. As 
in any cluster, the firms derive benefits resulting from their strategic relationships 
and their proximity. Indeed, Renville’s cooperatives have a lengthy history of inter-
organizational collaboration – not just in terms of co-investment, but also in terms 
of overlapping board appointments and working together to utilize co-products.  
 
MinAqua utilizes wastewater from SMSBC, turning the warm, nutrient-rich water 
into a valuable input. Other co-products have proven to be profitable and resulted in 
high local demand.  For example, Co-op Country has developed a manure 
management program to help area livestock producers comply with environmental 
regulations (Stefanson, Fulton and Harris, 1995).  The program removes manure 
from local livestock or aquaculture cooperatives and incorporates it into a fertilizer 
mix to sell to their members (City of Renville; Stefanson, et al., 1995). This program 
serves local farmers’ demand for fertilizer.  In the case of chicken litter, demand is 
high enough that there is “a waiting list for the litter” (City of Renville).   
 
Buschette reports that some farmers’ only regret is that “they cannot sell more corn 
to the co-op,” suggesting that local demand for the development of additional NGCs 
is still high.  Farmers perceive the NGC as an opportunity to invest in ventures that 
generate a market for their agricultural goods, benefit the local community, and 
preserve the family farm. The brisk wave of cooperative development did, however, 
leave some pockets too thin to invest in later ventures such as MinAqua. Many 
individuals or families that invested in one NGC, invested in several ventures 
(Looker, 1999 ). 
 
An investment in an NGC is now seen as a “proven investment.” And, some young 
producers are able to borrow from banks to invest in a large, cooperative venture 
whereas they would not qualify for funds for such risky endeavors on their own. 
Cooperation and collaboration, in itself, may also be an investment. Does a long 
history of cooperation serve as an investment in social capital, increasing the 
community’s capability of pursuing collective entrepreneurial strategies? Can 
successful attempts at cooperation be seen as an investment upon which subsequent 
cooperative endeavors, familiar with local successes, are able to capitalize?  
Studying communities such as Renville may inform this question. 
 
Continuing Innovation: Success or Failure? 
 
Clusters of organizations sharing similar characteristics provide a rich setting for 
research on networks, alliances, clusters, and other forms of inter-firm 
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collaboration. Many of the factors cited in existing research on clusters – knowledge 
spillovers, scale economies, learning by doing, and path dependence – are important 
elements of the Renville story. Moreover, Renville’s experience allows us to analyze 
several layers of changes in governance structure over time.  
 
After a steep rise in corn prices, a glut of corn syrup in the market, and weak 
delivery contracts, MCP was forced to look beyond their members for capital 
investment. MCP converted to a Limited Liability Company (LLC) in 2000, 
appearing to begin a successful turnaround. However, in 2002, MCP members voted 
to sell to Archer Daniels Midland Corporation for $756 million (Powell, 2003). While 
some sellers viewed MCP as a success due to high levels of returns on their initial 
investment, many producer-members were disheartened at the loss of local 
ownership and control of the facility. 
 
Golden Oval Eggs has also converted to a primarily producer-owned LLC as a 
means to access additional equity capital. Considering these conversions, several 
questions arise. Is the NGC a stable form of organization, or merely a transitional 
form between the cooperative and the investor-owned corporation? Indeed, both 
Golden Oval and Minnesota Corn Processors, despite success as NGCs, converted to 
LLCs. Is this the future for the remaining NGCs as well? If so, does conversion to an 
investor-owned entity constitute further innovation?  Or, does it constitute 
cooperative failure? Opinions differ among academics and investors2. 
 
Organizational Innovation, Local Clusters, and Secure Markets for 
Production 
 
The experience of producers in Renville, MN suggests that organizational 
innovation, in addition to technological innovation, plays an important role in 
enabling farmers to remain competitive in the global marketplace. Organizational 
innovation that promotes local ownership allows residual profits to return to the 
producer’s community. This is an exciting alternative to industrial park 
development which often generates employment, but transfers profits to investors 
outside the local area.  
 
We look back over Renville’s history of collective action among producers in an 
effort to understand the key factors that led to their success. What specialized 
knowledge, distinctive attributes, or unique resources led to the emergence of this 
cluster of organizational innovation? Can similar clusters of producer-ownership be 
replicated in other areas? If so, what spurs multiple producers to investment in 
locally-owned and controlled organizations? By answering these questions, today’s 
                                                          
2 Please refer to LeVay (1983) for a discussion of cooperative objectives.  By understanding a cooperatives 
objectives, we may begin to define success, innovation, and failure. LeVay, C. "Agricultural Co-operative Theory: 
A Review." Journal of Agricultural Economics 34, no. 1 June (1983): 1-44. 
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farmers can develop mechanisms for vertical investment and integration, allowing 
them to secure sustainable markets and higher returns for their production.
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